

## EXCLUSION AND ACCEPTANCE: CONSERVATISM AND RIGHTIST THOUGHT IN THE OEUVRE OF THOMAS MOLNÁR

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Most people think about the philosopher Thomas Molnár –in Hungary and abroad– as a Christian (Catholic)-conservative thinker and for those who had the chance to meet him at least once, talk to him, listen to his lectures e. g. in the 90s or early 2000s in Hungary, this view might solidify. I myself had the chance to talk to him many times, as he was sitting in his English-cut suit, ironed white shirt, clouded in cigarette smoke in a comfy armchair, discoursing about the most diverse subjects, but mostly about philosophy, politics, religion or about his travels. Then, as a university student I believed that he himself is the *par excellence* conservative Catholic philosopher, a reconsidered Chesterton-like figure, especially when he was walking with a stick, stopping here and there on the dirty streets of Buda or in the (then) run-down buildings of the University of Budapest (ELTE). He was so different from his environment; wise, a bit archaic but all-in-all a noble character. Thomas Molnár was a conservative phenomenon and a rightist one as well but in the Hungarian atmosphere of those days this could hardly be stated without the need of explaining oneself. «Conservative» remained then, as a consensus-based and essentially harmless category –this was sufficiently generic and more people were permissive towards it than towards «rightist», especially in academic circles.

Maybe it was because of this that Thomas Molnár disliked this epithet. In fact, during an informal conversation he identified himself as a *rightist* and *Catholic*, and *not as conservative* in my experience, whenever this came up. This, of course should be common knowledge about him as he clarified this in many of his writings in Hungary<sup>1</sup>. He was already asked to write a book about the issue in 1970 and

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1. This was done mostly in his first significant collection of essays that was published in Hungary, the Thomas MOLNÁR, *Századvégi mérleg* [Centennial reflections], Budapest, Kai-

approaching the subject a bit inversely (*La Gauche vue d'en face*) he dissected leftism with a rightist X-ray eye.

The former colleague of Michael Oakeshott –the renowned English conservative thinker who wrote the essay *On Being Conservative* (1956)<sup>2</sup> that is still considered as a significant reference point– Friedrich August von Hayek Austrian-English economist formulated the same question in negation<sup>3</sup> that was done by Thomas Molnár more than 30 years after him with similar intent, though with different results. This essay of Hayek that later became famous, first appeared as an appendix to one of his major works (*The Constitution of Liberty*, 1960 –of course right next to *Law, Legislation and Liberty*) that was later characterised as a *conservative* or libertarian manifesto (this debate might still be going on). This happened mainly because for many Western European conservative political parties Hayekian economic philosophy formed the basis of their platform, they used it and even tried to realise it when they were in power (Thatcher era).

Hayek –whose favourite author was the alpha of conservatives: Burke– was not a conservative very simply because he believed that conservatives were not strong enough politically and they were passive as well. That is why he writes in his now famous essay that: «Conservatism with its suspicion towards theories [...] forfeits those tools that would be needed in a fight among ideas [...] there is a chance it can slow down undesirable processes but because it does not show a different direction it cannot stop their progress, it only presents lukewarm and moderate versions of the prejudices of its age». Conservatives may soften the trouble but they cannot come up with a viable alternative for society concerning the future, they are not effective enough against, for example, a radical party based on rich ideology that can grasp power. For Hayek and for Molnár as well, there are elements that are attractive in conservatism; the practical part of political knowledge, the positive view on societal institutions that passed the test of experience (the existence of such institutions,

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rosz-Paulus Hungarus, 1999, containing seven writings: *The Leftist Phoenix Rises Again*, *Nationalism – with or without devilish auspices*, *Old and New Nationalism*, *Why am I not Conservative?*, *Rightist mentality*, *Diagnosing the Right*, *Limping Conservatism* and in the title essay of his 2004 book, *Right and Left* (*Right and Left: Where are they coming from, where are they heading?*). Apart from these his May 1994 article in the newspaper *Magyar Nemzet* is also significant: «Political Culture Viewed from the Side: Right and Left», which was published again ironically in the collection *With a Conservative Eye '94* (Tünde VAJDA (ed.), Budapest, Windsor Kiadó-Batthyány Alapítvány, 1995).

2. Published in Hungarian: *Holmi* (Budapest), n. 4 (2000). Cfr.: <http://www.c3.hu/scripta/holmi/00/04/03oakes.htm> (Translated by: Dezső BÁNKI).

3. Friedrich August VON HAYEK, «Miért nem vagyok konzervatív?» [Why am I not Conservative?], in Mária LUDASSY (ed.), *Az angolszász liberalizmus klasszikusai II. [The Classics of Anglo-Saxon Liberalism]*, Budapest, Atlantisz Kiadó, 1993.

their functioning alone) or the safeguarding of established societal customs and traditions, especially against any abstract, rationalist social engineering<sup>4</sup>. Still, Hayek does not consider this the unalienable virtue of conservatives, nor their property. Because of this, it is more important to state that all this cannot be realised by conservatives.

Together with the libertarian-conservative Hayek, Molnár is also able to state why he is not a conservative: «It is deceptive to speak of conservatism today, as it was consumed, with all its values, by liberalism. [...] You see, conservatism has no economic principle and no politics. On occasion it considers itself “völkisch” or defends the “Great Institutions”, but it more or less accepts liberal practice and it even takes over some points of issue from socialists»<sup>5</sup>. It is to this tendency that Thomas Molnár connects the fact –confessing in the same essay his American «classification» as conservative– that it became a trend in the 90s to talk about conservative-liberal politicians, regimes and thinkers, albeit these were simply liberals (he thinks the same of neoconservatives as well). In every significant political case, after attesting minor resistance the conservatives simply take over the opinions and arguments of the liberals, simply because they do not have any. Conservative philosophy only throws back the pace of liberals and the left but it does not finish this fight (the case of Reagan is not addressed as according to the categories of Molnár, he is a rightist). As for the right, Molnár found an apt role for conservatives as well; in the culture that is, if they are willing to work with the right. According to the view of Thomas Molnár, the conservative politician is simply defenceless before the left which wants to be and can be popular («the left cheats the people»), while the conservative dismisses popularity. The conservative cannot abide by the rules of mass democracy either; they are not able to mobilise masses thus, *the conservatives are limping*; they are not able to stand on their own legs, they will never be real conservatives they only claim to be. In reality though, modern-age conservatives nourish themselves with a fusion of progressive ideas,

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4. Oakeshott agrees with all this of course, as he writes in his above mentioned essay: «To be conservative, then, is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss. Familiar relationships and loyalties will be preferred to the allure of more profitable attachments; to acquire and to enlarge will be less important than to keep, to cultivate and to enjoy; the grief of loss will be more acute than the excitement of novelty or promise. It is to be equal to one's own fortune, to live at the level of one's own means, to be content with the want of greater perfection which belongs alike to oneself and one's circumstances. With some people this is itself a choice; in others it is a disposition which appears, frequently or less frequently, in their preferences and aversions, and is onto itself chosen or specifically cultivated».

5. Thomas MOLNÁR, *Századvégi mérleg*, cit., pp. 284-285.

and for this reason «it does not have substance with the power to grasp, it can be said to be more of a routine, the guarding of all-time interests»<sup>6</sup>. Molnár, while discarding, and –concerning conservatives– even condemning, negotiating and making a pact with the left, he treats the liberal hegemony as a fact and a reason why he cannot identify himself with it [i.e. conservatism]. He simply considers the right a lot more viable, more worthy, something that has a perspective in modernism and against the moderns: «There will always be rightists –but who would declare themselves conservatives?»<sup>7</sup>.

The «there *will always* be rightists» also means that, according to Thomas Molnár there always *have been* rightists and leftists. These two polarities mostly present themselves in the side-view of politics and at a certain point in history, when a cataclysm occurred (1789) it crystallised and everything that up until then was worldview, supposition, but firstly, philosophy was reshaped in a more concrete form. He defines the basis of this contrast as: «Despite the muddled lines of defence we declare that right and left do exist and the two differ from each other in substance. Principally in their philosophy. The right insists that things possess an unvarying substance and identity (defined by Creation) to which the left responds that there are no things, only processes in variable states»<sup>8</sup>. Identity and a perennial substance mandated by Creation and the exact opposite of this is where right and left can be grasped at their root, and because this has been philosophy for centuries, we may find the alphas of the two political currents in pre-Socratic philosophy as well. Molnár names these in the persons of Parmenides (*right*) and Heraclitus (*left*): «The man, the actions of the man, his history, his nature is not constant but constantly changing. In philosophical language: not substantia but change. This was proposed by the “father” of the left, Heraclitus, in classic sentences, to contrast Parmenides, who believes that everything is one and change is only an illusion. The left is, thus, “restless” (many times this is a great advantage!), aggressive, admires the new and uses every tool available to bring it about; but as soon as the new is realised (art form, educational system, literary style, the saving of the persecuted etc.), the left criticises, bothers and attacks it –until the next new is born»<sup>9</sup>. On the left, medieval realists (led by St. Anselm of Canterbury and his famous ontological argument for God) nurtured by Plato’s idealism, Immanuel Kant, while on the right, the nominalists (*Universalia sunt nomina* – «*The universals are mere names*»), considering Aristotle to be their intellectual forefather, and the representatives

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6. «Talking about that we are headed toward some global happiness is simply obscene». Interview with philosopher Thomas Molnár, *IGEN*, 2002, and in its original form on *Regnum! Portal*: <http://regnumportal.hu/regnum2/node/406> [Last checked: 24/07/2016].

7. Thomas MOLNÁR, *Századvégi mérleg*, cit., p. 287.

8. Thomas MOLNÁR, «Political Culture Viewed from the Side...», *loc. cit.*, p.47.

9. Thomas MOLNÁR, «What is leftism?», *Kortárs* (Budapest), vol. 41, n. 6 (1997), pp. 60-68.

of the Thomist philosophy established by St. Thomas Aquinas. These two sides were always, and will always be present, even when many try to achieve political gain by talking about a «reconciliatory synthesis» or, simply about their belief that there is no point in perceiving a substantial difference between the two sides. As to the genesis of the left as an actual political party Molnár points to the French and German branches of the reformation<sup>10</sup>, thus putting its emergence at the end of the 16th century (Huguenots)<sup>11</sup>, as something that already has a ready set of arguments present during the English revolutionary events of 1688. From the English revolutionary achievements the more radical ideas migrated to North-America («they created the religion of democracy»), while in 18th century France the societal arrogance created the revolution according to Thomas Molnár, not the mob that did not tolerate the rules and regulations and wanted more profit for themselves.

Molnár makes a remark on another great basic principle regarding political movements that «leftism is the cult of the subject» which thus stands against mediation and the mediators, and thus stands against hierarchy and authority, wants to do everything by itself, wants to be in everything (that is why he sees Luther as a –leftist– revolutionary as well). This «*non-acceptance*» creates a subversive disruption in the case of the left, which, at first, questions, deconstructs, analyses everything that is institutional (*philosophie de soupçon* –Paul Ricoeur, Michael Foucault, Lévi-Strauss) and, after that, stirs up, revolutionises and destroys. Maybe because of this the left always feels itself in danger, it is impatient, arrogant, it does not like the elite, even though it produces its own in the form of revolutionaries and intellectuals. Its realised present is not always something that is attractive thus, utopia naturally attracts the left, because of course society is bad and faulty and it needs (radical) healing. The leftist utopian political aim is the creation of a *new man* and a *new society* (that is why revolutionary terror is justifiable and necessary).

Besides the fact that it would be interesting to know if Thomas Molnár adheres to his statements made in the nineties and early 2000s today, it must be noted that he holds the blurring of the lines and the denial of differences against the right, although it seems that historically the foundation for this was laid down by the left towards the end of the 20th century. Already in the 1970s Jean-Paul Sartre was talking about how right and left were just «empty categories» that do not say anything about reality and the life the people are living. The well-known Italian socialist-communist, atheist philosopher and politician, Massimo Cacciari during

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10. «There was never a revolution in Germany, they prevented its outbreak twice: the parliament of Frankfurt in 1848, the nationalists and moderate socialists in 1920 and in 1945 the Americans. In contrast to this, the real German Revolution was brought about by Martin Luther», writes Molnár in his scathingly analytic piece entitled «What is leftism?», *loc. cit.*

11. Thomas MOLNÁR, «What is leftism?», *loc. cit.*

the 80s questioned in several of his writings<sup>12</sup>, whether it is still sensible to make leftist politics. He himself left the communist party and pursued more moderate politics, became the mayor of Venice, still as a left-wing candidate though. Claus Offe Marxist sociologist or Noam Chomsky was talking about how it is impossible to make a strong distinction between right and left, because they hoped that the collapse of the Soviet system creates new possibilities for the left. The topic had its actuality of course then, when communism weakened and later collapsed (Molnár returned to this fact, especially in his Hungarian-language writings), and maybe it was because of this that comparing many western (Isaiah Berlin, Thomas Nagel, Peter Glotz, Ernst Nolte, Laponce, Marco Revelli) and Russian (Alexander Dugin) opinions, Italian social-liberal historian of ideas, legal philosopher and senator Norberto Bobbio analysed the ideas outlined above in his book *Destra e sinistra. Ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica (Right and Left. The Reasons for Political Differences and their differentiation, 1994)*<sup>13</sup>. Bobbio was looking for an answer as to where we are really standing regarding the left. He believes that the basic criteria when differentiating between right and left are equality, liberty and peace, or rather, the relationship to these concepts (Bobbio, in the case of the left, considers equality a trap, as this leads to excessive levelling, and even he considers the stressing and claiming of complete equality a utopia). Bobbio, even as a leftist, claims that antagonism, the opponent-enemy picture and discourse related to this are inseparable from politics. The differentiation of right and left is forced by the problems and issues arising in political and societal reality, and answers to these can always be judged by the «leftist» or «rightist» labels which, since the end of the 20th century though express more the opinions of the people participating in the mediation rather than the politicians themselves.

The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben also refers to a type of emptying in political concepts in many of his writings during the first decade of the 2000s<sup>14</sup>, first and foremost relating to democracy. One cannot approach democracy in the usual, traditional philosophical way, as today democracy means more the *technique of*

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12. Giorgio PENZO, *Il potere: Saggi di filosofia sociale e politica*, Roma, Città Nuova, 1985; Massimo CACCIARI, *Icone della legge*, Milano, Adelphi, 1985.

13. The book, unknown in Hungary, was brought to my attention by Tibor Szabó in the February 2000. issue of *Magyar Tudomány* [*Hungarian Science*], in his article entitled «The Bobbio-type Concept of the Political Left and Right».

14. «Introductory Note on the Concept of Democracy», *Theory and Event* (Baltimore), vol. 13, n. 1 (2010); «*Might and Glory*» (<http://aszem.info/2016/06/giorgio-agamben-a-hatalom-es-a-dicsoseg/>, last checked: 1 July 2016); «From the Control-State to the Praxis of Destitution Power» (<http://aszem.info/2016/03/giorgio-agamben-az-ellenorzo-allamtal-a-destitualo-hatalom-praxisaig/>, last checked: 1 July 2016).

*governance* or the *body politic's constitution*<sup>15</sup>. Agamben already stopped using the concepts of political left and right, he looks for the emptiness and its practice deeper, with greater connections; «modern political thought has surrounded itself with such empty abstractions as the Law, the general will and popular sovereignty, while not even reacting to the problem that is decisive from every aspect: its relation to the compliance with governance and sovereignty. [...] the central mystery of politics is not sovereignty but governance»<sup>16</sup>. Thus, in modern politics the two consistent things mutually presupposing each other are given: the *political-legal rationality* and the *economic-governmental rationality*, which thus define the *form of the constitution* and the *form of government*. Apart from recognising and analysing the problem, the torturous question is still there: In the end, what ensures (political, state) sovereignty, or we do not need that anymore? Because the need for this did not disappear, only modern politics failed to fill it with meaning. Furthermore, are we able to hide the fact that there is no real alignment between the two parties and thus the centre –the hidden core of politics, as he mentions at one point– is completely empty and there is nothing/nobody that moves it? That lack of control then, which emerges this way will be both the source and demise of modern politics. One of Agamben's favourite quotes comes from an Italian police officer who told at the 2001 Genoa riots that the government did not want the police to keep the order but to control the chaos. Telling clairvoyance from a man of the law; without a real centre governmental control is practically without concept. That is why Agamben specified his basic stance towards the levelling government many times in almost all three of the here quoted articles: «not God but the angels, not the king but the ministers, not the law but the police –or, to be more exact, the dual governmental machinery is what forms and keeps you in motion»<sup>17</sup>. Not those then, who should be moving but only the movers.

Agamben reveals the frailty and desperate act of modern mass-democracy that brings into light the fact that the plain existence of democracy does not answer one of the greatest questions in politics: On what type of law is order or economic functioning built? He acknowledges in an inverse way that the political differences

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15. Cfr. the aforementioned theory of Kantorowicz about the «King's two bodies».

16. The translation of András LÁNCZI, who quotes this in his writing containing a comprehensive critique of democracy: «Democracy and Decay», *Kommentár* (Budapest), n. 2 (2016).

17. Translation of András Láncozi. In «Might and Glory» he says: «My inquiry showed that it is not sovereignty or the law that is the real problem –the hidden core of politics– but rather, governance. Not the king but rather, the minister, not God but rather, the angels, not law but rather the police or the state of emergency. More exactly: That governmental machinery which functions through a complex system of relationships and which connects these two poles». (Translation of Zsolt Levente Dobrai).

(left and right) are not valid anymore on this chessboard as the same possibilities exist for everyone.

A decade and a half before the diagnosis of Agamben, Thomas Molnár already stressed the sharp and necessary differentiation between the right-wing and the left-wing, and provides the reason for this, as well as proving the original existence of it. Molnár does not accept that after the fall of state-communism it is pointless to maintain the strict difference between right and left. He talks about the advancement of the left and the inertia and passivity of the right<sup>18</sup>, a right that does not always step over what the conservatives can do in reality and what they did; they only conserve and procrastinate, they are only interested in economics and business (USA) and they are relinquishing culture, ideology and the field of ideas to the left. The left basically rules over the politics of the modern age and the right can only exert any activity under its effect.

This unpreparedness and inertia of the right is not a new phenomenon though, according to Molnár, even before 200-years old events (i.e. the French revolution) it crumbles into a question mark or is only capable of rage. Thomas Molnár looks for the answer in the rightist mentality, even giving practical advice to the right (creation of a network of publishers, teachers, journalists) and flogging it, confronts it with its own flaws: «It paralyses itself, relives each day the bell hell of history, only not to sin against the taboos holding the iron power. It is not a surprise that God left it, God only helps those who have already helped themselves»<sup>19</sup>.

Thomas Molnár's rightism and his attachment to the right is not self-centred, cannot be measured by actual political or *Realpolitik*-criteria as those rightist regimes about which he talks with acknowledgment and to which he seems to have felt an attachment to (Franco's Spain, Chile of Pinochet, de Gaulle's France), do not exist anymore in the 90s. The right-wing politicians of that time created governments that were far more nuanced and restructured or, as part of the opposition, they did not consider these regimes to be worthy of following, not least because of the «*bell hell*» kept alive by the left. The right of that time accepted the normative system of democracy, its practice rigidified into a political religion in everything; Thomas Molnár was of a devastating opinion on contemporary, consensus-driven right-wing governmental systems, like Christian democracy or Christian socialism<sup>20</sup>.

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**18.** The regime-examples of Molnár are the same as earlier: the Chile of Pinochet, Franco's Spain, the rule of the Greek colonels during the agony years of the kingdom (1967-1974), Salazar's Portugal and the apartheid-system of South Africa. In many cases he leans on personal experiences.

**19.** «Rightist Mentality», in Thomas MOLNÁR, *Századvégi mérleg*, cit.

**20.** Following in the footsteps of his master, he notes that «“bourgeois Christianity” is a wilting plant, while “Christian democracy” or “Christian socialism” are fashionable, but hopeless experiments in alignment». Thomas MOLNÁR, *A modernség politikai elvei [Politi-*

Molnár saw one of the great, unique efforts and characteristic of the right in dismissing the frames of parties and their unquestioned rule, it did not aspire at all costs to create parties –national movements, leagues characterised it more. For the right recognised that a party splits the power, divides governance, and it does so with a liberal state by necessity and it partakes in the ideology of the state because of this, or else it loses its power. The grabbing of power according to different rules and different organisations is justified, but «trying all this ended with 1945. The western parties were transformed as well, following American examples, they became the parties of consumers and represented lobbies rather than different groups, all in the name of efficiency. Their ideology dissolved as well in the huge commercial campaigns, where the spectacle and catchphrases became the centre of party politics»<sup>21</sup> and thus «[...] after World War II the right was literary destroyed immediately in every European country. On the communist side this was dealt with hangings and Gulag; on the western half of the continent conformism fulfilled the same»<sup>22</sup> –defines the symptoms of the disease Molnár, whose rightism (too) has strong Gallican roots, as does his philosophy. Thomas Molnár goes through rightists who are maybe less known in Hungary: Henri Massis<sup>23</sup>, Jacques Maritain<sup>24</sup>, Pierre

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*cal Principles of Modernity*], Budapest, Európa Kiadó, 1998, p. 122.

**21.** Thomas MOLNÁR, «Political Culture Viewed from the Side: Right and Left», *loc. cit.*, p. 42.

**22.** Thomas MOLNÁR, *A modern kór: tünetek és ellenszerek: Öt beszélgetés Jean Renaud-val*, Budapest, Kairosz Kiadó, 2008 (*Du mal modern: Symptomes et antidotes*, Québec, 1996), p. 90.

**23.** Henri Massis (1886-1970) was a French, Catholic, nationalist, rightist conservative essayist, literary historian and critic. The influence of Massis on Catholic and nationalist youth before World War II was enormous. He did not take sides in the confrontation between the Church and the monarchist *Action Française*, but presented his sympathy towards the militantly monarchist *Camelots du Roi* without breaking with the Church. He promoted reconciliation with Mussolini's fascist state, supported Salazar's Portugal and participated in the Pétain-led Vichy-France (aligned with Nazi Germany). In the words of Thomas Molnár, who knew him personally: «[...] he considered himself the leading figure of the international rightist elite, who did everything to save the West».

**24.** Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) was a French Neo-Thomist philosopher. Thomas Molnár mentions him in a positive context many times, despite exerting the most influence over progressive Catholics (in Hungary as well, e.g. in the person of Vid Mihelics). He was invited to the II. Vatican Council as a layperson, whose work prepared the reforms of the Council (as it is known, Molnár sharply criticised the provisions and effects of the Council in many of his works). Mostly the metaphysical (Bergson, as well as post-Bergsonian) writings and the pieces on secular humanism were the ones with the most effect on him by Maritain. Thomas Molnár called him an «honest chameleon» for frequently going through political changes, depending on his interests.

Boutang<sup>25</sup>, Jean Madiran (aka Jean Arfel)<sup>26</sup>, Georges Bernanos<sup>27</sup>, Michel Déon<sup>28</sup>, Gustave Thibon<sup>29</sup>, Marcel de Corte<sup>30</sup>, characterised that by many of its elements active

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**25.** Pierre Boutang (1916-1998) was a French Catholic monarchist, conservative-rightist poet and translator. He was the editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Action Française*, and a member of the political organisation of the same name, a follower of Charles Maurras, professor of metaphysics at Sorbonne.

**26.** Jean Madiran (originally: Jean Arfel, also known as: Jean-Louis Lagor; 1920-2013), French traditionalist Catholic, monarchist-nationalist writer. He was the personal secretary to Charles Maurras, a columnist of the paper *Action Française*, and a member of the political organisation. He became well-known after his work on the political philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. He was a founder and editor of the traditionalist Catholic periodical *Itinéraires*, were Thomas Molnár also published.

**27.** Georges Bernanos (1888-1948), a Catholic, monarchist and French author and essayist whom Thomas Molnár considered his master in a Hungarian-language writing of his (*My Master; Bernanos*, 1997) and wrote his first book on him (*Bernanos: His Political Thought and Prophecy*, 1960). He was assisting at the publishing of the Hungarian editions of two of Bernanos's books (*Crime*, 1998; *The Day of the Carmel*, 2003) at Kairosz Publishing House, were many of Molnár's books were published. He became well-known in Hungary though with his *Diary of a Village Priest*, which was published multiple times, and was made into a film that had public screenings. Bernanos's political resolution until 1939 was firmly Catholic, nationalist, monarchist (he was a member of both the *Action Française* and the *Camelots du Roi*), and although his royalism stayed with him until the end of his life, he drifted away from AF after 1939 (he despised the collaboration with the Germans), and moved to Brazil. He became an advocate for de Gaulle and the *résistance*, and maintained a good, personal relationship with Simone Weil. Thomas Molnár described him in his aforementioned writing thus: «[...] like Ortega, Spengler and Heidegger, Bernanos is not writing about the masses taking over, not about the epic genesis and demise of ages, the absconding of gods, but about the soul, liberty, the divine seed that sprouts in the person. Bernanos was a hermit in the noise of the world, endlessly brave among the cowardly and thus even more humiliated souls».

**28.** Michel Déon (1919-2016), French writer, follower of Maurras, member of *Action Française*. The Commander of the Order of the Legion of Honour, he was awarded many renowned prizes for his life-work, which spans over more than 50 tomes.

**29.** Gustave Thibon (1903-2001), French Neo-Thomist philosopher, author, publisher and good friend of Simone Weil, who played a significant part in her conversion. Thomas Molnár was a personal good friend of his, he made the first publishing of Thibon's book, *Jacob's Ladder*, happen in Hungary in 2001, to which he even wrote a preface. In this he considers Thibon a «moralist teacher», akin to Descartes, Nietzsche and Pascal.

**30.** Marcel de Corte (1905-1994), French Catholic Neo-Thomist philosopher, who adheres to monarchist principles. He heavily criticised every segment (Marxism, egalitarianism, violent urbanisation, moral decay etc.) of the modernism that developed after the French revolution. Thomas Molnár knew him personally well.

monarchist, rightist and Catholic intellectual circle, the members of which were not always named, but they had detectable effects on Thomas Molnár throughout his career. Out of these he considered Bernanos his master, in his first book he analysed the political views of the French author –identifying himself with them, on many levels. Here we must note that with the French New Right (*Nouvelle Droite*) he was more polemical than a part of it, though many believed the opposite of this, in Hungary as well.<sup>31</sup> The Nietzschean, Neo-Paganist position of the New Right that lacked metaphysical justification did not satisfy Molnár, and even prompted him to formulate criticism, and because of this –and his intellectual openness– he agreed to pen a book together with Benoist, and he maintained acquaintances among the members of the New Right (he was still corresponding with Benoist in the 2000s).

With a bit of subjective exaggeration, it can be said that Molnár discovered his own rightism through these thinkers, and would consider himself more of a rightist. He knew many of them personally. However, he did not blur them all together, but assessed them individually, on occasion, even differentiating between periods and works. He did this as a living denial of that comfortable practice, in which many today call all this «integrant right», basically grouping together all (extreme) right-wing movements without criticism. Thomas Molnár already dismissed this practice when he called the totalitarian right counter-productive. Thomas Molnár’s great conclusion regarding the situation, political activity and personalities of the right is that by the end of the 20th century, «the right has no politics, only culture. Since 1945 politics can only be found on the left. The right “reacts” from time to time as Pinochet did in Chile or Antall in Hungary»<sup>32</sup>. To the circle of confessed Neo-Thomist, monarchist and on occasion counter-revolutionary French writers, whom Thomas Molnár valued, a number of such rightist, and conservative or (in a little less tangible way) reactionary authors like Ernst Jünger, T. S. Eliot and Ortega y Gasset were added.

He could also formulate a similarly specific opinion when asked about the situation in Hungary. When in 1994 in an interview in Hungary he was asked what kind of political parties could successfully lead Hungary in the following decade, the professor gave evidence of a firm vision: «Forces and parties that a., are standing on a national and Christian basis<sup>33</sup>, b., are enjoying through correct economic

31. Cfr. Thomas MOLNÁR, «“Baseless Basis” – or the Failure of Philosophy?», *Kortárs* (Budapest), vol. 51, n. 1 (2007).

32. Thomas MOLNÁR, «Politikai és irodalmi fasizmus: egy konzervatív nézőpont», *Miles Christi Évkönyv MMXIV*, 2014 (szerk. Pánczél Hegedűs János), pp. 105-127. (Original appearance: «Political & Literary Fascism: A Conservative Perspective», *Intercollegiate Review*, Fall 1979), p. 93.

33. These statements do align with the fact that Thomas Molnár declared his positive opinion about these kind of personalities of post-1945 Hungarian history: Cardinal Joseph

policies the trust of the majority of the citizens, and c., they do not scare away the critical elements, whose international support, irrespective of their numbers, means a significant influence over the domestic and foreign affairs of Hungary. The tying together of these three requirements in generous politics is very hard. Still, we must be loyal to our chosen line, because our country has a national and Christian reputation and we cannot change that even with so many Machiavellian cringes. This is our reputation abroad, in diverse manners, but this is also our particularity, by which we have to abide. Do we have such political parties? In a democracy, the task is very difficult, as parties enter into coalitions, they are making concessions, they dilute their visions and plans. In the nation though there is strong support for such a policy, the only successful one, if economic welfare accompanies it. Any other type of politics first and foremost would not be credible in the eye of the critics, secondly, it would be unachievable»<sup>34</sup>.

The strong, inner faith with a religious content is a part of rightism according to Thomas Molnár that should not only be inherent in an institutional form, but as an individual, personal criterion. He gives the reason of the great 19th century downfall<sup>35</sup> of rightism that the political power which until then could only be right-wing ceased to believe in itself, its own permanence, the sacredness of its institution, apart from the fact that people do not even believe in the sacredness of the Church. The most tragic thing in the current state of the right is that there are no real new sources, only reactions, provoked by the left, and the old sources are not nourishing the right appropriately. To achieve popularity and success, it employs leftist techniques, catchphrases and political culture, «in its embarrassment it looks for new justifications», adjusts itself in everything to the norm of democracy, in its wish to conform it does everything so that the antisemitism-card is not played against it, which can only be the right's own, according to common (leftist) perception.

Thomas Molnár puts right-wing antisemitism in its place by the way, considering it as a typically modern phenomenon, which could only have emerged when society already did not consider the Church's theological-political assessment of Jewry valid, but instead of this, the Europe, restructured by urbanisation, industrialisation and capitalism looked for new answers. The Jews in the modern age appeared as an «intangible, impatient, mobile environment» that by looking for a new set of

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Mindszenty, Prince-Primate of Hungary, Prime Minister József Antall or Crown Prince Otto von Habsburg-Lothringen. Of the pre-1945 rightist political sphere he valued the practice of Béla Imrédy and the Hungarian Life Movement as that of a conservative-motivated rightist organisation (contrasting them with the Arrow Cross Movement).

**34.** Thomas MOLNÁR, *op. ult. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

**35.** Molnár does not consider the great (conservative) statesmen of the first half of the 19th century or before, like Metternich or Richelieu to be rightists, as back then «the right did not exist».

arguments, positioned itself to the left. It was because of this that the majority of the organised right in a number of given situations (approximately from the Dreyfuss-affair)<sup>36</sup> reacted in a hostile way. Regarding the case of the mass genocide of Jews (holocaust, Shoah, Endlösung) during World War II he only mentions the roots (anti-Judaism, the prestige of science and technology and most of all the fear from bolshevism), judging them objectively. He mentions laconically in connection with this –historical event connected to the right– that «[T]he banality of evil characterises everyone»<sup>37</sup> and at the same time that he does not accept it as a special event that signals the change of history and needs to be handled differently<sup>38</sup>. He considered the clarification of the relationship of the right to decadence as opposed to progress or pessimism to be a lot more significant, as both of them were processes defined by the *Zeitgeist* that prevented the right in achieving their goals.

Both processes may help a rightist define himself in history, but the rightist, in both cases will use this to answer questions. Even viewed from cadence and order, the right is part of the (modern) decadence, but this defines it «too much» and this leads to dissolution. Still, the presence of decadence, the right’s attraction to decadence, or, rather the significance of the fact that decadence can be lived as a rightist is not a useless process in every aspect. «Decadence has its own logic; the people are widening the crevices which then swallow them in turn»<sup>39</sup> –states Molnár, referring here to recognition and not to a type of submersion, as the rightist position stands against this. Giving purpose to institutions, defining obligations, persevering in principles and in objectives, resisting subversion and chaos and temptation (exterior and interior). In essence, doing everything so that the decadence and the destructive elements do not become institutionalised. Rightism is vigilance and activity at the same time, according to the position of Molnár.

His rightism –even with the renunciation of the «conservative» label– is a natural consequence of value-based thinking and a strong faith in God that is

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**36.** Thomas MOLNÁR, *A modern kór...*, cit., p. 101. In reality, for the most part this was not even the majority, as not everywhere and not in the same way did antisemitism appear, and periodically it was entirely missing from right-wing parties (for example, a significant part of Italian fascists were Jews, according to some estimates, even 20-30% of them, the turn came with the introduction of racial laws in Italy in the 1930s).

**37.** *Ibid.* We found it important to indicate all this, because in the oeuvre of Thomas Molnár one can hardly find the issue of antisemitism, not even in his political writings. To all intents and purposes this issue simply did not interest him.

**38.** Here he refers to the assertion of Nobel-prize winning writer Imre Kertész who, reflecting on an interview question stated that after the holocaust, the validity of Judeo-Christian culture was over. Thomas Molnár thought it regrettable that the writer made a statement like this. (Cfr. Thomas MOLNÁR, «“Baseless Basis” – or the Failure of Philosophy?», *loc. cit.*

**39.** *Ibid.*, p. 104.

rooted in transcendence. This position, with all its defeats and compromises carries in itself the possibilities of activity, while conservatism is not adequate for this. This is why he puts the two terms into a pair of contradiction when he formulates his concise political credo: «I am a rightist, because I believe that things possess their own nature, and that they were created by an intelligent God who is neither masked nor obscure, neither a gambler. [...] I accept that I am labelled as a rightist but I would like to dispel a misunderstanding: I do not consider myself to be an Anglo-Saxon style “conservative” that is, the guardian of the status quo. When the moderns [...] cry “reaction” in connection with me, and label me anti-modern, this is again because of the inertia of a right that is incapable to show of itself an honest and truthful ID card»<sup>40</sup>.

Molnár does not want to guard the status quo (i.e. modernity, leftist politics) that is why he discards the (English-style) conservatism, though what he believes about rightism interlocks with the continental strain's organic concept of conservatism. «Being conservative does not mean that we are depending on what was yesterday. It means we live from that which is eternal» –avows Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, to which one can align what Titus Burchhardt said about the *consciously conservative man*. The relevant question is, what do we want to conserve and in connection to this how can we act politically, consciously, in knowledge of our existence and position, open to a sacral and spiritual centre which moves us and defines the order of society as eternal. Burckhardt and Molnár claims the same: We have to think through what is worth conserving and what do we have to discard. Burckhardt has discussed the criteria for this in his essay: «It would be wrong to draw from this the conclusion that the conservative attitude is, above all, equated with the motionlessness and the earthliness of man [...]. Conservativeness is fundamentally an aristocratic quality [...] the aristocracy, because of the traditions and education is conscious of the unity of forces of nature and soul, and possesses a transcendence that could hardly be gained in a different way, and anyone, who is in possession of the knowledge of his own superiority has the right to persist in it [...]. Since the downfall of the hierarchical order of society, which brought about the demise of nearly all traditional forms, the consciously conservative man lives in a vacuum. He is alone in a world that invisibly holds people as slaves, but at the same time brags how free it is; its all-suppressing uniformity promotes how rich it is in possibilities. They trumpet into his ear how humanity is gradually reaching higher spheres, and that human nature after millions of years of evolution will go through a transformation that will lead to the ultimate victory over nature. The consciously conservative man stands alone amidst those who lost their sobriety, is alone alert amongst the somnambulant, those who mistake their dreams for reality. He knows by his intellect and experience that man, however may he enthuse about new things,

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40. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

remains the same in good and bad; the fundamental questions in human life will remain the same, the answers to them were always known and, as far as they could be expressed in words, one generation passed it on to the next. The consciously conservative man cultivates this heritage»<sup>41</sup>.

Consciousness is needed for action, but with this we practically exceeded status quo conservatism and stepped over the description of the theme of living conservative, being conservative and conservative inclination formulated by Michael Oakeshott that is fundamentally sceptical but careful: «perceiving the situation it looks for things that might upset all that is normal and familiar». The «consciously conservative man» does not concentrate on familiarity but on what is true, and because of its origin, important, even if right now that is lost and not popular, he wants to conserve *that*, but, even more, he saves, reformulates and reinvigorates it.

Oakeshott believes that in substance conservative government rests on the practice of *vinculum juris*<sup>42</sup> as well, which basically provides remedies and compensational tools for victims of conflicts that arise between behavioural habits and interests, and means only a type of arbitration. This is satisfactory to serve as a foundation for legality, be it on an institutional or on a personal level, but it does not consider important to deal with the question of legitimacy. The standpoints of both Molnár and Burckhardt are contradictory on this, as all this is nothing else than what Molnár called «softening» or «preserving the status quo». Consequently, confessing to value and tradition does not exclude Molnár from the camp of conservatives: The definiteness of the sacred, of the transcendent, the metaphysical realities counts him here, even though these make up a cross-section in his case with a rightism that ensures action. Thus in the case of Thomas Molnár –completing his self-definition (rightist) even– we would consider it to be a more exact label to name him a *conservative-rightist* or maybe a *rightist-conservative*, if we wanted to point out his position based on his oeuvre and reception.

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**41.** Titus BURCKHARDT, «A konzervatív ember» [The Conservative Man], *Arkhé* (Budapest), n. 1 (1996), pp. 27-33. Online: <http://regnumportal.hu/regnum2/node/208> (last checked: 1 July 2016). We do not know whether Thomas Molnár was familiar with the book of Titus Burckhardt, but he read the one about alchemy and, together with Voegelin, had appreciated it.

**42.** *Vinculum juris*, which could not be said to be a Roman legal institution expresses from the point of particularity, what e.g. *summum jus*, *summa iniuria* does from the point of universality: When the following through (to absolute excess) with positive law goes against truth and justice. The «shackles of law» is when positive (actual) law inhibits one to act justly (e.g. from the standpoint of natural law). Here in the case of Oakeshott, *vinculum juris* simply means when the law creates an obligation, so there is a legal binding force in societal contact, thus this is a term of the law of obligations.

Although Thomas Molnár –from the 1980s and 90s the latest– considered himself purely rightist, sometimes immediately refusing the conservative label. Everyone has the right to label himself in any way he wishes, but posterity has that right as well, to view the case from a different point of view (cfr. Hayek, Voegelin), or, as in our case, to refine it. The eternal issue of the touching point, the relationship of rightism and conservatism is thus raised by the life-work of Thomas Molnár as well.

The question of political rightism of course is a positional question first and foremost, in this Thomas Molnár adopted an opinion against leftism and all of its forms and thus he was a consistent rightist who absorbed the political ethos of the right and even added to it and was willing to actualise it as well. He was a rightist with a conservative mind, supporting the supposition that the natural habitat of all conservatives should be on the political right, even if with a critical mind and even if for a real (Anglo-Saxon) conservative the wellbeing of his issues and lifestyle is what is more important, and not politics.

As there are many conservatives, there are many conservatism-conceptions, but at the same time there are many right-wing ideologies as well that is why in itself *rightist and conservative* does not say much substantive or important about someone. Thomas Molnár was a *value-conservative* first and foremost, who did not consider conservative political action and its possible outcomes satisfactory, even though he had sympathies towards politicians and thinkers considered conservative. Thus, a conservative political position is a contemplative situation, which gives one a free overview, possibilities of opposition and joining to right-wing values, reserving the right to not to declare himself in support of any conservative dimension, especially considering contemporary political action (e.g. the support of any given political party). We may investigate the conservatism of Thomas Molnár most accurately in relation to liberty, courageous and independent thinking and opinion-forming and the search for truth.

A rightism that is only connected to parties is problematic anyway. According to Thomas Molnár the right-wing has a natural aversion towards political parties and their rule (this originally was the field of the left), the real right preferred leagues, associations and movements that could mobilise, create unity, but at the same time allowing internal diversity. The unitary, monolithic (extreme) right-wing party is an answer to the danger posed by the (extreme) left, basically using leftist tools –Thomas Molnár’s aversion toward this type of politics is understandable. The proportionality and fragmentation of the political sphere is of course natural, but this does not mean that one has to submerge in this and become part of it (it is probably impossible anyway), which, for a rightist is acceptable, but for a conservative, it is not an option. Regarding this question, what would make Thomas Molnár more of a conservative –apart from his natural commitment fundamentally towards science,

culture and religion— is that (according to his fundamental conviction he already had in the 1970s) everyday politics are ruled and defined by the left. That is why there is almost no possibility for original right-wing politics, maybe for a few, more significant reactions (Franco, Pinochet), or the activities of a more significant fake-rightist personality (de Gaulle). This type of conservative position and habit that, in the case of Thomas Molnár by every indication was very much alive, made it possible that he does not just join contemporary political conservatism, or to be exact that he would rather *not* join it and *not* confess himself to be conservative, because in essence this would mean liberal and he is against that.

All this differentiation is still there in the case of the right with Molnár, for whom the political reality of the right would have been more acceptable than that of the left (and if he would ultimately find this in a rightist manifesto or activity, he considered confronting it important).

Apart from this he put the (extreme) right to the test as well<sup>43</sup>, characteristically from a conservative point of view. Tocqueville, Bergson, Jacob Burckhardt, Eric Voegelin, Mircea Eliade, Wilhelm Röpke —those people whom Thomas Molnár considers in a analysing piece<sup>44</sup> of his to be *real conservatives*, characteristically never thought of themselves to be directly or in any other way conservative, still, it was important to him that they are «not the pillars of the Zeitgeist». For —according to Molnár— the nature of the conservative habit is dual: Firstly, that under the conservative thought there is a concrete substratum, which instigates real action, secondly, that this «reality has its roots in a transcendental frame of reference and because of that it is not incidental or illusory»<sup>45</sup>. The attachment of conservatives to reality is understandable in philosophy and science, although in politics it is a barrier of responsibility, it places restraints on (radical) actions, even when the world is against values important to them. At this point —which to him shows an irreparable flaw— Molnár leaves the conservatives to themselves and breaks through towards the right.

But towards *which* right?

The relationship-system of the political right can really be interpreted inside the given political community, the ideal basis here though in almost every case

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43. Thomas MOLNÁR, «Political and Literary Fascism: A Conservative View», in János PÁNCZÉL HEGEDŰS (ed.), *Miles Christi Évkönyv MMXIV*, pp. 105-127, (translated by Zoltán Pető). The piece was originally published in the Fall 1972 issue of the *Intercollegiate Review*.

44. Thomas MOLNÁR, «Conservatism and Intelligence», in János PÁNCZÉL HEGEDŰS (ed.), *Miles Christi Évkönyv MMXIV*, pp. 73-87 (translated by Péter Uhel). The piece was originally published in the Fall 1974 issue of the *Intercollegiate Review*.

45. MOLNÁR, *op. ult. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

creates ideology. The contemplation of the Molnár-type conservative habit really ossifies in the right, creates a structure for itself and seeks space for fulfilment. It does not look for those rightist forms that have conservative tendencies as well (e.g. Christian socialism) but for those that can act according to the conservative habit, it does not strive for consensus, that is why, in great part it also criticises the modern right-wing («right of centre») political parties lacking substance and being little more (or maybe even less, because they lose) than the contenders of their leftist challengers.

The way he sees Fascism from a conservative point of view may provide a useful guideline to the understanding of the conservative habit of Molnár: Above all, without unity and closure even after the 1945 apocalyptic global conflagration, and this concept of his is even more nuanced than the well-known division of Ernst Nolte<sup>46</sup> (1963). In essence, Molnár does not discuss fascisms, but aims, achievements and roots, motivational aspects, based on which the subject can be validly analysed and based on this he draws distinction between four parts<sup>47</sup>. These were right-wing formations that were able to show values in themselves (culture, philosophy) and as a political movement as well (liquidation of the left –the practice of the «violence of pessimists» thesis, the accomplishment or urging of a monarchist restoration, the concept of the ethical state etc.) in the 20th century. Molnár puts things into perspective and he notes that in Fascism pessimism, and after its downfall, nihilism and decadence (even if alert) is less attractive.

According to Molnár, rightism is more culture and art than politics after 1945 and that is why he lists the parts to be valued in the Fascist ethos. These are (the concentration of) power, purity, might, the unique pessimism-energy dyad, fraternity, their conception and living of death (or to be exact: the scorning of it),

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**46.** Ernst NOLLTE, *Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche*, 1963; in Hungarian: Ernst NOLLTE, *A fasizmus korszaka*, Budapest, Kairosz, 2003. Apart from the French *Action Française*, Nolte dissects Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. Nolte talks about Christian conservatism as a source in the case of the French, and the defining of fascisms as rightist age-characteristics is not far from Thomas Molnár's conservative analysis, but at the same time on many points they diverge in their conclusions (e.g. trans-political phenomenon-theory, the question of practical transcendence, etc.).

**47.** Namely «a., a «prehistoria» which relates to the anti-liberal and anti-democratic doctrines and movements of the 19th century the same way as in the different order of movements to monarchical restoration; b., the 20th century's alert of communism and the change this caused from monarchical restoration (which was judged to be, as related to its consequences to be too slow and unstable) to a authoritarian rule of a national leader (Duce, Caudillo, Führer, Conducător, Chef, etc.); c., many literary-philosophical current, movement and school that was at first of a romantic, then nihilist stance; d., which could maybe be called «Nietzscheism» on the front of politics, culture and world view». Thomas MOLNÁR, «Political and Literary Fascism...», *loc. cit.*, p 106.

a type of productive idealism which stems not the least from romanticism. Molnár puts it in an exact way: «the Fascist authors are romantics and romantics have not been contemplating much since Chateaubriand and describe nature in a way that they project their own vulnerability and enthusiasm into the outside world»<sup>48</sup>. All this is built into a rightist utopia (the willing of the empire). Applying his own theory of utopia Thomas Molnár (after Voegelin) talks about «rightist gnosis», were fascist/rightist writers and thinkers align and can be unified: Knut Hamsun, Ernst Jünger, Curzio Malaparte, Raymond Abellio (*Georges Soulès*), Jacques Chardonne, Jean Cau, André Malraux, Julius Evola, Hermann Hesse, Martin Heidegger and, again, de Gaulle. The fascist epithet applied to this group of rightist intellectuals –that is according to Molnár only partly political, and at least as much culture-oriented– is misleading, and because of that it would have been easier to simply call them rightist, authoritarian, reactionary or elitist. «They saw every defeat as deeper and deeper descent to hell»<sup>49</sup> –the overheated state and opportunity of the historical moment slipped away, the experiment that was brought to life to break the menace (progressivism, leftism) proved to be a terrible hazard (totalitarianism, mass genocide, apocalyptic destruction during World War II). The atmosphere that was created by the willing of the restoration of purity in despair and pessimism can be (re)lived in a given rightist political time and space and by every indication is the rightist man’s character’s own. Namely because all this is the all-time right’s own, especially when in politics it is rarely given the chance to take the lead and even the left may get conservative political vote.

Alain de Benoist, with whom Molnár wrote a book<sup>50</sup>, made an effective experiment with the extreme right to confront it with leftist suppositions, viewpoints and prejudices<sup>51</sup>. He tried to make it conscious through argumentation on a rational basis that in the rebellion against communism there is no place for the modern intellectual’s double standard in connection to totalitarianisms (after Arendt: the political form of a well-defined age). The historical-political aim of this is to contrast Fascism with democracy through any means necessary, in order to stress that there is a democratic element in communism (there is not) and at least its origins are humanitarian (they are not), because it stands opposite to Fascism. Molnár *ab ovo* discards this –leftist, manipulative– standpoint, and evaluates from a sovereign, conservative viewpoint that was able to be a political factor before 1945, in opposition to the left; the one that turned inwards after the war and can

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48. Thomas MOLNÁR, «Political and Literary Fascism...», *loc. cit.*, p. 114.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

50. Alain BENOIST-Thomas MOLNAR, *L’eclipse du sacré*, Paris, Table Ronde, 1986.

51. Alain BENOIST, *Communisme et Nazisme: 25 Réflexions sur le totalitarisme au XXe siècle (1917-1989)*, Paris, Labyrinthe, 1998.

only leave values behind in culture.

According to Thomas Molnár it matters if someone or something is rightist or leftist, if this distinction were to disappear from the world that can only serve particularly leftist aims: egalitarianism, generalisation, the denial of truths that are created and thus contain the transcendent. The voicing to that there are no right and left is in essence the denial (destruction) of hierarchy and authority, and, the erection of fake-hierarchy and fake-authority (complements), the denial, discard, and ultimately the destruction or seriously attempted destruction of the natural order. This could be followed by the creation of new, but in essence fake «unit(s)», the excitation and control of chaos in a political system devoid of its centre.

With the actual deconstruction of the dyad of right and left governance will become only power engineering, *ochlocracy* (ὀχλοκρατία i.e. the «rule of the street or the mob») will rule through the principle of *majoritarianism*. Political life and governance without the dyad of right and left does not bring about cohesion, not a paradisiac unity without discord, but rather, a *phalanstère*-society without the need to distinguish. Difference is of divine origin, its abolition is a diabolical act. The attack on the universal governance-model in the absolute sense is an attack on God, an attempt to break down the divine order of Creation. Thus if the great dyad of politics ceases to be, so will the possibility of the person to rise and transcend. When someone declares their rightism referencing Thomas Molnár or his position, he brings life back to its original, sacred state. Not to political or national traditions, not to philosophical schools, not to his own existential setting or maybe to social upbringing, but simply to the essence of Creation; to how the world was given to us by God.